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COMMENTS
LIFE AFTER DEATH: CORPORATE DISSOLUTION
AND THE CONTINUING CORPORATE AND
SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY DOCTRINE IN
CALIFORNIA
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Doctrine
The doctrine of continuing corporate and shareholder liability
after dissolution has recently undergone a major evolution in Cali-
fornia resulting in severe inequities for large classes of potential
claims.1 Presently, dissolved corporations can be sued after dissolu-
tion regardless of whether the claims arise before or after the date of
dissolution.2 Furthermore, the shareholders of dissolved corporations
can be sued to the extent of the assets distributed to them upon disso-
lution, as long as suit is filed not later than four years after the date
of dissolution.' This doctrine is inequitable because it prevents recov-
1. Under the current law, claims arising against corporations dissolved before January
I, 1992, are limited to those foreseeable claims provided for at dissolution. Pacific Scene, Inc.
v. Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182, 1187 (Cal. 1988). Claims arising against corporations
after dissolution can be brought against the dissolved corporation, but there is little chance for
recovery. Penasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court, 812 P.2d 154, 159 (Cal. 1991). This state of the
law effectively eliminates recoveries in cases where the claims do not arise until after the cor-
poration has dissolved.
A recent revision to the California Corporations Code attempted to alleviate this inequity for
claims arising against corporations dissolved on or after January 1, 1992. The revised statute
provides that shareholders can be sued on claims arising after corporate dissolution to the
extent of the corporate assets distributed to them upon dissolution. CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 201 (a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1992). However, this law limits recovery to claims likely to arise
within a four year period of time. Id. § 2011(a)(2)(B). Thus, the current law continues to
eliminate recovery on construction, pharmaceutical cases, and all other claims not likely to
arise for a long period of time. See discussion infra part IV.B.l.a. Indeed, the four year provi-
sion provides for a better chance of recovery, but claims arising against corporations dissolved
on or after January 1, 1992, that are not likely to arise in a four year period of time continue
to be prevented from making any recovery beyond those assets retained by the corporation after
dissolution. See discussion infra part IV.A.2.
2. Penasquitos, 812 P.2d at 160.
3. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(a)(2)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1992). The Legislature revised
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ery on any claims arising later than four years after the date of
dissolution.4
Although the doctrine permits a greater number of claims to be
made today than in prior years,5 the current state of the law results
in inadequate protection of potential claimants and should be recog-
nized as an inappropriate public policy. As the law now exists, Cali-
fornia corporations operating businesses with a high degree of risk of
harm to the public are permitted to operate for limited periods of
time, distribute their profits, and later dissolve and reincorporate the
same basic business enterprise without being held accountable for
damages incurred by the original corporation.6 As the result of legal
planning through incorporating, operating, and then ultimately dis-
solving, potential claimants may be left with no recourse for serious
harms caused by corporate activities, while the shareholders escape
liability without relinquishing their profits. The current state of the
law results in severe inequities which are developed in this
comment.'
this section of the California Corporations Code in October 1991 to include claims against
shareholders. See discussion infra part II.D. It is effective only against shareholders of corpo-
rations dissolved after January 1, 1992. Claims against corporations dissolved prior to January
I, 1992, are governed by the California Supreme Court's decision in Pacific Scene, Inc. v.
Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182 (Cal. 1988) which held that shareholders cannot be sued on
claims arising after dissolution. See discussion infra part II.B.2. and accompanying notes.
4. See discussion infra part IV.B.l.
5. Under the common law, dissolved corporations were not permitted to be sued at all
after dissolution. See infra part II.B.1 and accompanying notes for a discussion of the common
law treatment of continuing corporate liability after dissolution. The 1988 California Supreme
Court decision in Pacific Scene abolished this common law notion and held that corporations
could be sued after dissolution to the extent of their undistributed assets. Pacific Scene, 758
P.2d at 1188. The 1991 statutory revision of California Corporations Code § 2011 then over-
ruled Pacific Scene, extending liability to shareholders of dissolved corporations, thereby in-
creasing the number of potential defendants that could be held liable for claims arising after
dissolution. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1992).
6. This is not a hypothetical situation, but one that was brought to life in the California
Supreme Court decision that prompted revision of the California Corporations Code. In Pa-
cific Scene, claimants could recover against the corporation and its shareholders so long as the
claim arose prior to dissolution. Pacific Scene, 758 P.2d at 1188. If a claim arose after dissolu-
tion, only the corporation could be sued. Penasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court, 812 P.2d 154,
160 (Cal. 1991). The legislature amended § 2011 of the California Corporations Code to
overrule the Pacific Scene decision, thereby extending liability to shareholders for a period of
up to four years after the date of dissolution. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011 (a)(2)(A)-(B) (West
Supp. 1992). See infra part II.B. for a complete discussion of the aforementioned cases and a
detailed description of the California Legislature's intent in revising the code.
7. See infra part IV.
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B. Recent California Supreme Court Decisions
Within the past four years, the California Supreme Court de-
cided two major cases on the issue of continuing liability after corpo-
rate dissolution.8 In Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc.,9 the
court presented its interpretation of California Corporations Code
section 2011, holding that corporate dissolution shields the share-
holders from claims arising as a result of the dissolved corporation's
business activities.' In Penasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court," the
court explained that causes of action survive dissolution, to the extent
of a corporation's undistributed assets. 2 Penasquitos established the
novel concept of the "retirement" of a corporation upon dissolution,
rather than its "death."' 3 Under this doctrine, a corporation contin-
ues to exist after dissolution for the purpose of winding up its af-
fairs, including the defense of lawsuits and the payment of any
claims made against it.' 4 These cases left unresolved the issue of
compensation for innocent customers of dissolved corporations where
the corporate assets have been fully distributed prior to the discovery
of their claims. 5 Subsequent to these decisions, the legislature at-
tempted to rectify the situation by amending the California Corpora-
8. See case cited infra note 9.
9. Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182 (Cal. 1988).
10. Id. at 1188.
11. Penasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court, 812 P.2d 154 (Cal. 1991).
12. Id. at 160.
13. Id. at 157. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered the meaning of Califor-
nia Corporations Code § 2010 which provides:
A corporation which is dissolved nevertheless continues to exist for the purpose
of winding up its affairs, prosecuting and defending actions by or against it and
enabling it to collect and discharge obligations, dispose of and convey its prop-
erty and collect and divide its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing busi-
ness except so far as necessary for the winding up thereof.
CAL.. C.-RP. CODE § 2010(a) (West 1992). The court's interpretation of this statute supports
its decision that corporations continue in existence after dissolution. The court explained:
At common law, dissolution extinguished the corporation's existence; this corpo-
rate "death" explained why the corporation could not be sued and why any
judgment taken against it was void. Not only would it be unfair to sue an entity
that was incapable of defending itself, it would also be senseless to render judg-
ment against an entity that had become nonexistent. The modern survival stat-
utes render these rationales inapplicable. It would be incongruous to allow a
corporation that exists for purposes of defending actions and discharging obliga-
tions to defend a lawsuit on the basis that it did not exist.
Penasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court, 812 P.2d 154, 157 (Cal. 1991).
14. Penasquitos, 812 P.2d at 157.
15. In Penasquitos, the California Supreme Court recognized that suing corporations
after dissolution and distribution of assets is generally a fruitless endeavor. Id. at 161; see
discussion infra part IV.A.2.
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tions Code with provisions intended to provide for a more equitable
result."
C. Senate Bill No. 1188
The response of the California State Legislature was a modifi-
cation of the provisions of Corporations Code section 2011." Senate
Bill 1188 (hereinafter S.B. 1188)18 retained the Penasquitos rule
that causes of action continue to be viable against a dissolved corpo-
ration, whether arising before or after dissolution of the corpora-
tion. 9 The revised statutory scheme provides that actions may be
enforced against the dissolved corporation to the extent of its undis-
tributed assets.20 However, the new law also provides for the recov-
ery of any assets which have been distributed on dissolution to the
shareholders, but only to the extent of their pro rata share2" of the
distributed assets.22 This new rule limits suits against the sharehold-
ers to a period of time not exceeding the earlier of four years or the
expiration of the statute of limitations for the particular cause of
action, 3 while the corporation itself 24 may be sued indefinitely.25
16. In an attempt to provide some form of recovery for claimants, the California Legis-
lature developed Senate Bill No. 1188. S.B. No. 1188 was developed to amend § 2011 of the
Corporations Code, relating to shareholder liability after the dissolution of a corporation. S.B.
No. 1188, amending Cal. Corp. Code § 2011(a)(1) (West 1991). See infra note 27.
17. S.B. 1188 was approved by the Governor of California on October 5, 1991, and filed
with the Secretary of State on October 7, 1991. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEl. OF CALIFORNIA, LEG-
ISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST at 2302 (1991). This bill amended California Corporations
Code § 2011(a) and is effective for claims arising against corporations dissolved on or after
January 1, 1992. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(a)(4) (West Supp. 1992).
18. Supra note 17.
19. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(a)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1992).
20. Id.
21. The amended statute does not distinguish among the different types of shareholders
of corporations (for example, those shareholders holding common as opposed to preferred
stock). Id. § 2011(a)(l)(B).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 2011(a)(2)(A)-(B).
24. This comment addresses only voluntary dissolutions that do not involve any fraud or
legally inappropriate corporate activities. In such cases, the corporation's officers and board of
directors have not committed any illegal acts.
Because the amended portion of the statute does not include such aforementioned individuals,
they are not affected by it. The legislature intended S.B. 1188 to amend existing law with
regard to shareholders and was not intended to affect other individuals associated with the
corporation.
In a letter from the author of S.B. 1188, California Senator Ed Davis, to Rick Rollens, Secre-
tary of the Senate, the Senator explained: "S.B. 1188 is not intended to affect any existing
provision of law imposing personal liability upon officers, major stockholders, or other persons
having charge of the affairs of a corporation." Letter from Ed Davis, California State Senator,
to Rick Rollens, Secretary of the Senate, State of California (Aug. 30, 1991) (on file with the
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Indeed, the revised version of the code generally expands a claim-
ant's potential for recovery by increasing the number of defendants.
However, the statute as it now stands fails to provide a solution for
serious claims that may arise' more than four years after
dissolution.2"
D. Problems With the Current State of the Law
Presently, the revised statute does not fully resolve the poten-
tially inequitable results of corporate dissolution. By amending sec-
tion 2011, the legislature attempted to correct the problem created by
the California Supreme Court's recent interpretation of the Corpora-
tions Code.27 While the revised statute has broadened the types of
recovery against dissolved corporations, large classes of claimants are
still left with no remedy. For example, many causes of action are not
discovered within the four year time period"8 and, as a result, these
claims are eliminated before the statute of limitations has even
started to run.29
Moreover, the statute has even eliminated a significant number
of formerly recoverable claims. Prior to the statutory amendment,
claimants whose claims are now cut off could recover against the
shareholders of a dissolved corporation under the equitable trust
fund theory.3 0 This theory provided for recovery against the share-
office of the California State Senate).
25. The legislature intended S.B. 1188 to amend existing law with regard to sharehold-
ers and not to affect the corporation's liability. In a letter from the author of S.B. 1188, Cali-
fornia Senator Ed Davis, to Rick Rollens, Secretary of the Senate, the Senator explained:
S.B. 1188 is not intended to limit in any way the existing right to bring claims
against dissolved corporations themselves set forth in Section 2010 of the Corpo-
rations Code and recently reaffirmed by the California Supreme Court in the
case of Penasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1991). In this
regard, the provision of the bill amending Section 2011(a)(1) of the Corpora-
tions Code is intended to be declaratory of existing law.
Id.
26. See discussion infra part IV.B.I. for examples of claims not likely to arise within a
four year period of time.
27. The comments to the legislative history of S.B. 1188 explain that the law prior to
the amendment "creates an arbitrary and unfair distinction between pre-dissolution and post-
dissolution claims . . . . S.B. 1188 enacts a comprehensive system regulating the manner in
which claims, whether they arise pre-dissolution or post-dissolution, may be pursued." Assem-
bly Subcomm. on the Administration of Justice, Lloyd G. Connelley, Chairperson, July 3,
1991 S.B. 1188/p. 2-3, Date of Hearing: July 16, 1991.
28. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(a)(2)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1992).
29. See discussion infra part II.A.l. for examples of claims not likely to arise within a
four year period of time.
30. See discussion infra part II.B.I. pp. 24-26 and accompanying notes for a complete
discussion of the equitable trust fund theory.
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holders for claims which arose before the dissolution but only to the
extent of the assets distributed to each shareholder.3 No time limit
was imposed on these suits so long as the claim arose prior to disso-
lution. 2 Presently, where a corporation anticipates unasserted
claims, the law requires that it set aside assets to meet such claims. 3
In contrast, claimants could still have recovered distributed assets
from the shareholders under the equitable trust fund theory prior to
the effective date of S.B. 1188, regardless of whether the corporation
had anticipated such claims. 4 Since the enactment of the statutory
revision, claimants' recoveries of assets actually distributed to share-
holders must be filed within four years after dissolution. 5 As a re-
sult, all claims not filed within four years after dissolution are now
unrecoverable.
The newly revised statute also shields the corporation itself
from claims which are unknown to the officers of the corporation at
dissolution even though they may be anticipated. 3  The revision of
Corporations Code section 2011 results in a rule which only requires
corporations to set aside funds on dissolution to meet claims which
are expected to be filed within four years after dissolution.37 In some
cases, this set-aside is substantially less than prior to the revision of
the statute. Consider, for example, the claims likely to arise in con-
struction defect cases. In these instances, a real estate company in the
business of developing lots for the building of residential homes may
know that twenty of the houses in a subdivision are subsiding only
very slightly. The corporation may also know that all twenty homes
will be completely destroyed when a severe storm (for example, a
storm so severe that the occurrence of it is not likely more than every
twenty years or so) hits the area. If a storm of this magnitude oc-
curred twelve years ago, then the corporation can empirically calcu-
late the amount of corporate funds to set aside to meet all such
claims which are expected to be filed within four years after dissolu-
tion.38 Under the old rule, funds would have to be retained to repair
31. Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182, 1183 (Cal. 1988).
32. Id. In its discussion of § 2011 of the California Corporations Code, the court recog-
nized that as long as claims arise prior to dissolution, there are no restrictions on how long suit
can be brought. Id. at 1184.
33. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2010(a) (West 1992).
34. Pacific Scene, 758 P.2d at 1183.
35. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(a) (West 1992).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Although the legislature intended to provide a more equitable result, the revised
statute fails to provide a remedy for large classes of claims. See infra notes 104 and 148 for
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all twenty subsiding houses in full.3 9 Under the new rule, actuarial
calculations may result in insufficient funds being retained for the
repair of a single home.4" Unfortunately, the owners of any homes
destroyed after the retained funds have been disbursed are prevented
from recovery since the corporation has only set aside a limited
amount of funds.
A final shortcoming of the revised statute is the limitation of
recovery against shareholders solely to those assets distributed upon
dissolution.41 Corporations could cunningly plan their liquidations so
as to eliminate major distributions upon dissolution by declaring div-
idends to the extent legally possible immediately prior to the dissolu-
tion.42 Such careful planning could further deny legitimate claimants
the recovery contemplated by the statute because the assets distrib-
uted upon dissolution would be reduced pro tanto. In light of the
inequitable situations presented herein, this comment addresses the
following question: Should shareholders be allowed to avoid serious
tort, products liability, and other claims, by dissolving the corporate
form, and thereafter reincorporating or transferring the corporate as-
sets to other business enterprises?
E. Scope of this Comment
This comment inquires into the scope of the continuing corpo-
rate liability doctrine after dissolution and the newly revised corpo-
rate dissolution statute in California.43  Further, this comment dis-
cusses relevant statutes and historical case law development, and
additional examples of the types of cases where corporations can set up subsidiary corporations
and operate for a limited period of time; dissolve and set aside funds for existing claims and
distribute remaining funds to the shareholders; and ultimately escape liability for claims aris-
ing after a four year period of time.
39. Since this law applies to claims arising on or after January 1, 1992, inventive finan-
cial planners will be able to exercise this option inappropriately. For example, a corporation
deciding to dissolve could declare a large dividend payment to its shareholders right before
dissolution. Upon dissolution, consequently, there would be little left in the way of cash assets
to distribute to the shareholders and therefore little for claimants to recover, since the statute as
it now stands precludes recovery in excess of the amounts distributed to the shareholders upon
dissolution. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(a)(l)(B) (West Supp. 1992). The inequitable results of
this possibility, however, could lie dormant for years until claims against the dissolved corpora-
tion arise, at which point, all proceeds from dissolution have been reinvested or spent and
recovery on such claims becomes a virtual impossibility. See discussion infra part IV.B.2-3. for
a discussion of the balancing of shareholders' rights to reinvest the proceeds of the assets dis-
tributed to them upon dissolution.
40. See discussion infra part IV.B.I.c.
41. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(a) (West Supp. 1992).
42. See discussion infra part IV.B.I.c.
43. See infra part IV.
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examines the current state of the law in the context of the two recent
California Supreme Court decisions and the recent legislative enact-
ment passed in response thereto."' In addition, this comment ana-
lyzes the competing public policy considerations underlying the cur-
rent state of the law. 45 This comment also analyzes several classes of
potential claims that currently are without remedies."' Finally, this
comment proposes a solution that would better effectuate public pol-
icy concerns.4 7
II. BACKGROUND
A. General Corporate Law Principles
California law provides business people with an opportunity to
invest in business enterprises without incurring personal liability via
a vehicle known as the corporation."8 The corporate form is a legal
entity, distinct from those who form it, with its own legally recog-
nized existence."9 The corporation is statutorily created,5" recognized
by the government,5" and is responsible to its debtors and creditors
similar to an individual.5"
The main reason individuals decide to utilize the corporate form
44. See infra part I.
45. See infra part II.
46. See discussion infra part I.C.
47. See infra Part V. The proposed solution amends existing law by adopting many
aspects of formerly applicable common law remedies as well as reflecting California's statutes
of limitations. Most importantly, the proposed solution more equitably provides for the inter-
ests of claimants as well as shareholders and insures that reasonable recoveries can be made.
Unlike the present circumstances, the solution offered will achieve the Legislature's intended
balance, without disrupting the underlying premises behind corporations law. The proposed
solution should be adopted, because it will put an end to the cycle of inequity that traps the
seriously injured in large classes of claims and will ultimately benefit society by presenting
equitable solutions to remedy the problems involved.
48. CAL. CORP. CODE § 200(a) (West 1992). Section 200(a) provides: "One or more
natural persons, partnerships, associations or corporations, domestic or foreign, may form a
corporation under this division by executing and filing articles of incorporation." Id.
49. Id. § 200(c). Section 200(c) provides: "The corporate existence begins upon the il..
ing of the articles and continues perpetually, unless otherwise expressly provided by law or in
the articles." Id.
50. Id § 200.
51. Id. § 200(a), (c). Filing the articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State
begins the existence of the corporation. Id.
52. Id. § 207(a)-(h). This section empowers a corporation to qualify and do business in
any other state; to issue, purchase, redeem, receive, take, or otherwise acquire, own, hold, sell,
lend, exchange, transfer, or otherwise dispose of shares, bonds, debentures and other securities;
to assume obligations, enter into contracts; and to participate with others in any partnership,
joint venture, or other association, transaction or arrangement. Id.
[Vol. 33
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is to shield themselves from liability," By so doing, the corporation
itself is solely responsible for any claims arising out of its business
dealings.54 This limited liability prevails during the existence of the
corporation and thereafter. 5 While claimants are concerned with re-
covery after corporations dissolve, shareholders seek reasonable as-
surances that the completion of one business investment is final, with
concomitant protection of the proceeds received upon dissolution for
reinvestment in new corporate activities. 5"
B. Liability Upon Dissolution
When a business operating in the corporate form ends, the cor-
poration is normally dissolved.5" The theory of corporate limited lia-
bility requires reasonable protection of shareholders in corporations
from liability once the business is discontinued.58 Often, claims arise
53. California Corporations Code § 200 authorizes individuals to associate and do busi-
ness as a corporation. See supra note 48. The law permits the creation of this type of entity for
the promotion of business activity while limiting an individual's personal liability. Authors
Cary and Eisenberg, noted corporate law scholars, explain this doctrine:
Conventionally, the most attractive nontax attributes of the corporate form are
said to be limited liability ....
...[whereas] Islole proprietors and general partners are personally liable
for obligations that arise out of the conduct of their business[,] ...the share-
holder-owners of a corporation are not personally liable for their debts ....
This legal rule is conventionally expressed by the statement that shareholders
have "limited liability."
WII.I.IAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS 66
(6th ed., concise 1988).
54. California corporate law provides:
[Any contract or conveyance made in the name of a corporation which is au-
thorized or ratified by the board, or is done within the scope of the authority,
actual or apparent, conferred by the board or within the agency power of the
officer executing it, except as the board's authority is limited by law other than
this division, binds the corporation, and the corporation acquires rights thereun-
der, whether the contract is executed or wholly or in part executory.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 208(b) (West 1992).
55. California corporate law provides:
A corporation which is dissolved nevertheless continues to exist for the purpose
of winding up its affairs, prosecuting and defending actions by or against it and
enabling it to collect and discharge obligations, dispose of and convey its prop-
erty and collect and divide its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing busi-
ness except so far as necessary for the winding up thereof.
Id. § 2010(a).
56. See infra part II for a discussion of the balancing of shareholders' rights to reinvest
the proceeds of the assets distributed to them upon dissolution.
57. California Corporations Code Chapter 20 provides the statutory authorization and
requisite procedures for dissolution of the corporate form. CAL. CORP. CODE ch. 20 (West
1992).
58. See discussion infra part 11.
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after the final distribution of assets for which the business would
have been held responsible were the corporation still functioning as a
business entity.59 Upon dissolution, the corporation is required to re-
tain sufficient assets to meet existing claims,6" and the remaining as-
sets are distributed to the shareholders of the corporation. 6'
Theoretically, the philosophy of limited liability of shareholders
attempts to balance the competing interests of those who consume
corporate products and services with those who invest in the corpora-
tions. However, California corporations law reflects a public policy
favoring the shareholders' interests and resulting in an uneven distri-
bution of rights and liabilities among these two types of parties.62
Although the law recognizes the shareholders' rights to complete one
business transaction, accumulate' the proceeds, and reinvest them in
new corporate activities," 3 it is important not to sacrifice the rights of
injured claimants in the meantime.6
1. Common Law Treatment of Dissolved Corporations: The
Equitable Trust Fund Theory
Originally, at common law, the dissolution of a corporation
completely "terminate[d] its existence as a legal entity, and
render[ed] it incapable of suing or being sued as a corporate body or
in its corporate name." 5 This rule allowed corporations to shield
their assets from the reach of creditors through distribution to share-
59. Two recent California Supreme Court cases, Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc.,
758 P.2d 1182 (Cal. 1988), and Penasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court, 812 P.2d 154 (Cal.
1991), clearly illustrate this point. In both cases, claims arose against the corporation that
graded the lots on which claimants' homes were built. The cases both involved Penasquitos,
Inc., a corporation which had dissolved prior to the discovery of both causes of action.
60. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2010(a) (West 1992).
61. Id. § 2010(c).
62. See infra part II for a discussion of the balancing of shareholders' rights to reinvest
the proceeds of the assets distributed to them upon dissolution.
63. See infra part II for a discussion of the balancing of shareholders' rights to reinvest
the proceeds of the assets distributed to them upon dissolution.
64. See discussion infra part 1.B.l for a complete discussion of the equitable trust fund
theory. Under this theory, claimants were permitted to reach assets distributed to shareholders
upon dissolution as recovery for injuries caused by the former corporation's business activities.
This theory is no longer viable since it was overruled in Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos,
Inc., 758 P.2d 1182, 1183 (Cal. 1988).
65. Crossman v. Vivienda Water Co., 150 Cal. 575, 580 (1907). In Crossman, plaintiffs
commenced an action against the defendant, alleged to be a corporation, for an accounting and
the recovery thereon of some $33,250, and also against certain persons alleged to be stockhold-
ers thereof, to recover from their proportionate shares of the amount sought from the corpora-
tion. Id. at 577. Crossman established the equitable trust fund theory. See supra note 59.
[Vol. 33
CORPORATE DISSOLUTIONS IN CA
holders pursuant to dissolution.66 Essentially, claimants had no
means of recovery against a dissolved corporation. The courts devel-
oped the equitable trust fund theory to ameliorate the severe inequi-
ties of this common law rule.67
Under the equitable theory, "a creditor of the dissolved corpora-
tion may follow such assets as in the nature of a trust fund into the
hands of stockholders." 68 When the theory was invoked, creditors of
the corporation were permitted to recover the distributed assets, and
the stockholders were treated as though they held the assets as trust-
ees. 9 In other words, the assets of the dissolved corporation were
deemed to be a trust fund against which corporate creditors had a
claim superior to that of the stockholders. °
Although the equitable trust fund theory was developed by
courts sitting in equity to accomplish the most fair result to all inter-
ested parties, it has been abolished in California through a combina-
tion of the ruling of the supreme court in Pacific Scene, Inc. v.
Penasquitos, Inc.7  and the recent statutory changes attempting to
71expand the potential recovery after dissolution of a corporation..
2. California Supreme Court Abolishes the Equitable Trust
Fund Theory
a. Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc.
In 1988, the California Supreme Court substantially modified
the common law equitable trust fund theory.73 The supreme court's
66. Michael Wallach, Products Liability: A Remedy in Search of a Defendant-The
Effect of a Sale of Assets and Subsequent Dissolution on Product Dissatisfaction Claims, 41
Mo. L. REv. 321, 328 (1976).
67. Koch v. United States, 138 F.2d 850, 852 (10th Cir. 1943). In Koch, a creditor of a
dissolved corporation was permitted to reach assets distributed to shareholders of a dissolved
corporation under the equitable trust fund theory. Id.; see also supra note 59.
68. Koch, 138 F.2d at 852.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182, 1183 (Cal. 1988).
72. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(a) (West Supp. 1992). Sections 1800 to 2011 of the Cor-
porations Code were enacted as part of a comprehensive statutory revision and these laws
comprise a broad and detailed scheme regulating virtually every aspect of corporate dissolution.
Pacific Scene, 758 P.2d at 1184. Although the aforementioned provisions were enacted in
19.77, recognition of the legislature's domination of the area of corporate liability after dissolu-
tion was not recognized by the judiciary until the Pacific Scene decision in 1988. That decision
clearly articulated the point that the equitable trust fund theory was abolished by the enact-
ment of the statutory provisions pertaining to corporate dissolution. Pacific Scene, 758 P.2d at
1184.
73. Pacific Scene, 758 P.2d at 1187.
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ruling in Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc.," was based on an
action brought by homeowners against the builder of tract homes
when the homes in their development sustained damage as a result of
subsidence. 5 The builder, Pacific Scene, Inc. (hereinafter Pacific),
cross-complained against the developer of the residential lots, Penas-
quitos, Inc. (hereinafter Penasquitos), a dissolved corporation." The
Superior Court of San Diego County dismissed the cross-com-
plaint." The court of appeal upheld the dismissal of the cross-com-
plaint, agreeing the dissolved corporation itself could not be sued.7"
Yet the court of appeal reversed with directions to grant Pacific leave
to cross-complain against the former shareholders of Penasquitos
under the equitable trust fund theory. 79
On review, the California Supreme Court examined the impact
of the California Corporations Code provisions enacted in 197780 on
the trust fund theory.8" The court concluded that the legislature in-
tended to occupy the field with respect to the remedies available
against former shareholders of a dissolved corporation, "thus pre-
empting antecedent common law remedies,"82 and barring any recov-
ery under the trust fund theory.83 The supreme court held Pacific's
post-dissolution claim was barred, and that claimants whose causes
of action arise after the dissolution of a corporation cannot sue the
shareholders of a dissolved corporation. 4
As a result of the Pacific Scene decision, customers who
purchase defective products and unpaid creditors whose causes of ac-
tion arise after dissolution have little or no remedy against the share-
holders who profited from engaging in high risk business practices.8 5
Moreover, because of the court's indepth discussion and analysis of
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1183.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see also supra note 13.
81. Pacific Scene, 758 P.2d at 1187.
82. Id.
83. Id. As a result of this decision, the claimants had virtually no remedy for the injuries
caused by the negligence of Penasquitos, Inc. The court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of
the case. Since this case abolished the common law doctrine of the equitable trust fund theory,
no recovery was permitted. This case only applies to claims against corporations dissolved
before January 1, 1992. The amendment to California Corporations Code § 2011 overruled
the Pacific Scene decision. See supra part I.C.
84. Pacific Scene, 758 P.2d at 1186.
85. This eliminates large classes of claims in construction defect and pharmaceutical
drug manufacturing cases. See discussion infra part IV.
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the procedural posture of the case (having originally been brought
against the corporation rather than the shareholders), it was gener-
ally inferred from Pacific Scene that potential claimants also could
not sue the corporation after dissolution.8" Because a number of is-
sues remained unclear after the Pacific Scene decision, the supreme
court again faced the issue of continuing corporate liability in a case
that clarified any former misconceptions regarding suits against dis-
solved corporations.
8 7
b. Penasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court
Within three years after the Pacific Scene decision, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held dissolved corporations could be sued so long
as the statute of limitations did not bar the claim.88 In Penasquitos,
Inc. v. Superior Court, homeowners brought an action to recover
damages for construction defects against a dissolved corporation
which had graded residential lots for the building of homes.89 The
supreme court held that there is no legal barrier to any suit against a
dissolved corporation itself for injury or damage caused by the corpo-
ration's pre-dissolution activities even though the claim occurs or is
discovered after dissolution.90 This decision expressly clarified the
misconception created by Pacific Scene, by specifically holding claim-
ants can sue a corporation after it has been dissolved.9
In reaching its conclusion, the Penasquitos court reaffirmed its
pronouncement in Pacific Scene that, "California no longer follows
the common law rules with respect to the dissolution of a corpora-
tion."92 Instead, the court explained, claims against corporations are
governed by the California statutory scheme.93 According to the
court, section 2010 of the California Corporations Code specifically
86. The court held that "the statute bars the assertion of postdissolution claims in eq-
uity." Pacific Scene, 758 P.2d at 1187. Use of this language left the issue of corporate liability
unclear by failing to specify if this decision was limited to shareholders, or if it also extended to
suits against dissolved corporations as well.
87. Penasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court, 812 P.2d 154 (Cal. 1991).
88. Id. at 161.
89. Id. at 157. Pacific Scene and Penasquitos both involved the same company, Penas-
quitos, Inc. In the first case, the cause of action arose nearly four years after the date of
dissolution. Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182, 1183 (Cal. 1988). In the
later case, the claim also arose nearly four years after the dissolution of the corporation. Penas-
quitos, Inc. v. Supprior Court, 812 P.2d 154, 155 (Cal. 1991).
90. Penasquitos, 812 P.2d at 160.
91. Id. at 157.
92. Id. at 156.
93. Id.
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permits parties to sue dissolved corporations. 4 The court fu'rther
concluded post-dissolution actions are not limited to pre-dissolution
claims, but that unlike actions against shareholders, permissible ac-
tions against the corporation include claims arising after the corpora-
tion has filed its certificate of dissolution. 5 Penasquitos attempted to
clarify some of the issues concerning the liability of dissolved corpo-
rations by holding that corporations do not disappear upon dissolu-
tion.9" Essentially, they live forever and potential claimants can al-
ways sue the corporation after dissolution."7 This determination
failed to completely resolve the issue, however, because suing a cor-
poration after dissolution generally results in no recovery.98
C. Problems With the State of the Law After Penasquitos
Despite the Penasquitos holding, which clarified the right of
claimants to bring causes of action against a dissolved corporation at
any time, as a practical matter, the assets have usually been distrib-
uted to the shareholders and the corporation has nothing left for the
claimants to recover.99 Virtually any claim discovered after a corpo-
ration dissolves, therefore, has no realistic remedy."' This is because
the law does not require assets to be retained unless the claims are
known to the corporation's board of directors upon dissolution. 11
The greatest inequity in the dissolution of corporations, however, is
that only causes of action arising before the corporation has dissolved
can realistically receive a recovery from the shareholders.'02 Exam-
ples of this inequity include situations similar to the Pacific Scene
94. Id. at 157. The court explained the purposes for which the corporate existence
continues after dissolution, emphasizing in particular the provisions of California Corporations
Code § 2010 that identify the purposes of prosecuting and defending actions by or against it
and enabling it to discharge obligations. Id.
95. Id. at 160.
96. Id. The court stated, "[A] corporation's dissolution is best understood not as its
death, but merely as its retirement from active business." Id.
97. Id. The court's pronouncement of retirement rather than death was based on the
California corporate law statutory scheme, and the court was persuaded that "our statutes
permit the corporate existence to continue indefinitely for the purpose of such actions." Id.
98. Pen asquitos held that a claimant is free to sue a dissolved corporation, but, "bring-
ing suit against a dissolved corporation on a postdissolution claim will often be a pointless
exercise, because the corporation will have no assets with which to satisfy a judgment against
it." Penasquitos, 812 P.2d at 161. See discussion infra part IV.A for a discussion of the nu-
merous problems claimants face when suing corporations dissolved before January 1, 1992, on
claims that occurred after the corporate dissolution.
99. Penasquitos, 812 P.2d at 161.
100. Id.
101. CAL.. CORP. CODE § 2010 (West 1992).
102. See supra note 98.
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and Penasquitos cases where the claim is not likely to be discovered
until many years after dissolution.1"3
Other classes of ignored claims include individuals who
purchase medicine from pharmaceutical companies, or obtain medi-
cal treatment, the defects of which do not show up until a later gen-
eration."4 Although the Penasquitos decision succeeded in clarifying
that dissolved corporations could be sued,"0 5 the supreme court left
unresolved the issue of recovery for claimants who can recover noth-
ing from a corporation that has distributed all of its assets to its
shareholders.
D. Legislative Revisions to the California Corporations Code
Recognizing the limitations of the Pacific Scene decision, the
legislature immediately sought to modify the existing state of the law
by amending the Corporations Code." 6 Prompted by suggestions
from the California State Bar Association,' 0 7 the legislature revised
section 2011 of the California Corporations Code in October
103. Although in these two cases the claims arose within a four year time period, many
construction defect cases do not arise within such a short period of time. For example, in
Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 111 2d. 171 (1982), the plaintiff filed a complaint against the
builders of his residence. The decision held that in construction defect cases, a long statute of
limitations is required to reveal latent defects which do not manifest themselves for a signifi-
cant period of time. Id. at 174.
104. A classic example of this is the DES (in the medical world known as diethyl-
stilbesterol, a drug developed to assist in the prevention of miscarriage during pregnancy)
cases. In the most famous DES case, Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (1980), women
brought a class action against drug companies manufacturing DES, seeking to recover for
injuries sustained as a result of administration of the drug to their mothers during pregnancy.
Id. In Sindell, plaintiffs were exposed to the drug prior to birth. Id. at 926. Because of de-
fendants' advertised assurances that DES was safe and effective to prevent miscarriage, plain-
tiffs' mothers had ingested the drug during pregnancy. Id. Plaintiffs became aware of the
danger from such exposure only after entering their teen years and in many cases, not until
reaching adulthood. Id. As a result of the DES ingested by their mothers, many of the plain-
tiffs developed malignant tumors, and suffered from other severe maladies that required con-
stant monitoring to insure early detection of additional malignancy. Id. This case represents
the potential for pharmaceutical companies like Abbott Laboratories to use subsidiary corpora-
tions for the development of such drugs as DES, to dissolve, and then to escape liability when
medical disorders arise many years after the business has ceased its corporate activities.
105. Penasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court, 812 P.2d 154 (Cal. 1991).
106. A telephone conversation with Charles Fennessey, Attorney for California State
Senator Ed Davis' office, revealed that it was the California State Bar Association that spon-
sored Senate Bill 1188. See supra notes 16-17. The State Bar drafted a preliminary version of
the bill and forwarded it to the Legislature to be passed shortly after the Pacific Scene deci-
sion. Telephone Interview with Charles Fennessey, Attorney for the Office of Senator Ed Da-
vis of California, Sacramento, California (Jan. 6, 1992).
107. Supra note 106.
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-1991."08 This revision changed the existing law by providing that
upon the dissolution of a corporation, its shareholders may be sued
in the corporate name upon a cause of action arising before or after
its dissolution.1°9
This newly revised version of section 2011 allows claimants to
collect from the shareholders to the extent of their pro rata share of
the claim"' or to the extent of corporate assets which have been
distributed to them upon dissolution of the corporation, whichever is
less."' Section 2011 now requires claims against the shareholders to
be commenced before the expiration of the claim's statute of limita-
tions, but in no case later than four years after the dissolution of the
corporation." 2 The law also codifies the holding of Penasquitos by
providing that causes of action against a dissolved corporation,
whether arising before or after the dissolution of the corporation,
may be enforced against it, to the extent of its undistributed assets."'
E. Intentions of the California Legislature
Prior to the statutory revision, corporate law distinguished be-
tween pre- and post-dissolution claims against dissolved corpora-
tions. Before January 1, 1992, shareholders could not be sued upon
a cause of action arising after the corporation's effective date of dis-
solution." 4 The revised version of section 2011 of the California
Corporations Code is an attempt by the California Legislature to
resolve the inequities raised by the supreme court's decisions and to
provide a more equitable solution. The purpose of this comment is to
address the fact that although the statutory response provides a more
just result in a few limited circumstances, it does not go far enough
in remedying the truly inequitable situations."'
108. S.B. 1188 was passed by a unanimous vote on October 7, 1991. See supra note 17.
See supra part I1. for a full discussion of the history and intent of the revision of California
Corporations Code § 2011.
109. CAL. CORP. CODE.§ 2011(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1992).
110. Id. The result of the revised statute is to overrule Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penas-
quitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182 (1988). Pacific Scene prohibited recovery against the shareholders
of a dissolved corporation on claims arising after dissolution. Id. at 1186.
111. CAt.. CORP. CODE § 2011(a)(2)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1992); see supra note 21.
112. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(a)(2)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1992).
113. Id. § 2011(a)(1)(A).
114. Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182, 1187 (Cal. 1988).
115. The amendment to § 2011 of the California Corporations Code, effective January
1, 1992, overrules the Pacific Scene decision by establishing that shareholders can be sued for
claims arising after dissolution of a corporation for a period of four years after the date of
dissolution. See supra part II.B. for a discussion of the Pacific Scene decision. Pacific Scene
held that shareholders could never be sued for claims arising against a corporation after disso-
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III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
A. In General
In very general terms, the current state of the law denies large
classes of claimants adequate recoveries from defendants that were
solvent at the time of their corporate dissolution. Furthermore, the
shareholders of dissolved corporations are also being permitted to es-
cape liability after engaging in business activities involving poten-
tially serious harm to claimants and from which they have derived
substantial profits. The law as it now stands treats dissolved corpora-
tions differently depending on the effective date of their dissolution,
and the problems vary accordingly.
B. Problems for Claimants Suing Corporations Dissolved Before
January 1, 1992
As the Penasquitos case recognized, the major limitation of the
law applicable to claims against corporations dissolved before Janu-
ary 1, 1992, is the number of potential defendants. 1 6 The number of
potential defendants arbitrarily varies depending on when the claim
arises." 7 For claims arising prior to dissolution, the claimant is enti-
tled to sue the corporation and its shareholders. 1 8 Claimants whose
claims arise after dissolution, are not afforded the same rights. For
those claims arising after dissolution, claimants are limited to bring-
ing suit against the dissolved corporation only, and are prevented
from recovering against the shareholders of the dissolved corpora-
tion. 9 The later claimants can recover only to the extent the corpo-
ration holds any assets not already distributed to the shareholders
upon dissolution." The legislative revision to the California Corpo-
rations Code attempted to rectify this arbitrary distinction." 1
lution. Pacific Scene, 758 P.2d at 1187.
116. Prior to January 1, 1992, claimants whose causes of action arose after a corpora-
tion had dissolved were limited to suing only the dissolved corporation. Once a corporation has
dissolved and distributed its assets, however, there is very little left for recovery. See supra part
11.B.2. The revised California statute, effective against corporations dissolved after January 1,
1992, increases the number of potential defendants for a claimant to sue. Under the new law,
claimants can sue the shareholders of a dissolved corporation on claims arising against the
corporation after dissolution. CAL. CORP. Cot)E § 2011(a) (West Supp. 1992).
117. Pacific Scene, 758 P.2d at 1185.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See supra note 27.
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C. Shortcomings of the Amendment to Section 2011
The amendment to section 2011 solves only some of the
problems left unresolved by the supreme court's decisions in Pacific
Scene and Penasquitos. As a result of the amendment, claims arising
against corporations dissolved after January 1, 1992, have a greater
number of potential defendants, but recoveries are still inadequate in
several significant ways. Indeed, while the legislature attempted to
.balance the competing interests of the finality of claims and compen-
sation of creditors, the amendment to the code fails to properly bal-
ance the rights of claimants and shareholders of dissolved corpora-
tions in three specific ways.
First, the statute fails to fully consider the ramifications of the
four year limitation incorporated into the bill. The four year rule is
an inappropriate public policy decision because it fails to address
very serious tort and products liability claims that typically arise
well after the four year period has expired.122 As a result, corpora-
tions are currently permitted to segment their businesses, operate
them for limited periods of time, dissolve and reincorporate later.'2"
This process allows corporations to escape liability for damages
caused to claimants by those dissolved businesses whose former
shareholders have made a fortune.
This scenario has been brought to life in the Pacific Scene and
Penasquitos cases which permitted a residential land developer to
incorporate and do business, dissolve the company, and reincorporate
later doing exactly the same kind of work. 24 Had the statute been
applicable to the defendants in these two cases, the claimants still
would have had some recovery since their causes of action arose
within the four year time limitation.' 25 But this is the exception in a
construction defect case, not the rule. Hence, a statute designed to
alleviate discrepancies failed to achieve its intended result in the very
type of case that brought about the change in the law.
The second problem with the amendment is that the statute
eliminates claims formerly recoverable prior to its enactment. For
122. This is common in construction defect cases where the defect is often discovered
more than four years after completion but well within the 10 year statute of limitations. Inter-
view with Douglas Scott Maynard, Esq., Maynard Law Offices, in Campbell, CA. (Sept. 29,
1991). It could be a common practice among pharmaceutical companies with the development
of new drugs. See infra note 148.
123. See supra note 6.
124. Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182 (Cal. 1988); Penasquitos,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 812 P.2d 154 (Cal. 1991).
125. Pacific Scene, 758 P.2d at 1183.
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example, case law effective prior to the statutory enactment permit-
ted the shareholders of dissolved corporations to be sued for claims
arising prior to dissolution.1 26 Their claims were not subject to any
time limitation such as the four year rule, except the claim's statute
of limitations.1 27 Moreover, when claims arose prior to dissolution,
The corporation's board of directors was required to set aside assets
to satisfy those claims only if the board knew of the claims at disso-
lution, 28 and the remaining funds were distributed to the sharehold-
ers. "'29 A claim brought five to ten years after it arises can still be
valid absent dissolution. As a result of the revised code, however, the
claim is barred against a dissolved corporation since setting aside as-
sets is only required when the board of directors knows about the
claim. 130 With the amendment to the statute, claimants cannot pur-
sue claims against shareholders after four years, and any retained
funds not claimed within the four year time period can be distributed
to the shareholders. 31
Finally, the statute denies adequate recovery to claimants by
limiting recovery against the shareholders of dissolved corporations
to the value of the assets distributed to those shareholders pursuant
to the dissolution.1 32 In 'this instance, the statute fails to consider the
potential for slick corporate planning by greedy shareholders. The
statute fails to address the situation where a corporation heavily
laden with potential claims against it declares dividends to the maxi-
mum extent legally permissible just prior to dissolution. In this fash-
ion, the corporation could distribute a large portion of its assets prior
to dissolution, completely free of all claims. Since the claimants are
only entitled to recover assets distributed upon dissolution,' 33 they
recover only what little was retained for distribution at dissolution,
and will be unable to touch the large sums received by the share-
holders through the dividend distribution.
126. Id. at 1182.
127. Id.
128. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2010 (West 1992).
129. Id.
130. The four year limit was a suggestion made by the California State Bar Association,
thought to be more equitable than not being able to sue the shareholders at all. Interview with
Larry Doyle, Deputy Attorney of the Legislative Bar Committee and Lobbyist for the Busi-
ness Law Section of the California State Bar Association, Uan. 24, 1992).
131. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(a) (West Supp. 1992).
132. Id. § 2011(a)(1)(B).
133. Id.
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D. Summary of the Problem
In general, the statutory enactment is sufficient to provide fair
results in the garden variety types of cases; cases that are expected to
arise in a relatively short period of time. This amendment is helpful,
for instance, in the case of an auto mechanic who has failed to repair
a claimant's car properly, or a grocery store that has sold sour milk,
but the amendment does not address a number of truly inequitable
situations.
Indeed, the statute helps provide for recovery where claims arise
within a four year time frame. However, it does not resolve the
problem for claimants whose causes of action arise four years and
one day after the effective date of dissolution. 3" In particular, it does
not help in cases where the claim is not likely to arise for a long
period of time. For example, the statute does not help the elderly
couple who spent their entire life savings to build a retirement home,
only to learn that the builder negligently tested the land for its solid-
ity and the home was damaged due to subsidence ten years after it
was built. Nor does the statute provide a remedy for the woman who
recently had breast implants and whose arm becomes paralyzed fif-
teen years after the surgery. 3 In the latter situation, there exists the
potential for pharmaceutical companies to set up subsidiary corpora-
tions to develop new, risky medical technologies. These subsidiaries
can be dissolved, and years later, when serious medical damage is
discovered, the four year limitation has passed and the claimant is
again without a remedy . 36 In both cases, the well advised corpora-
tions will have dissolved and the individual claimants will have no
remedy for their tort claims. Moreover, these are the types of claims
which are generally unforeseeable as that term is used in California
Corporations Code. 3 This means that the corporation is not re-
134. For example, a homeowner may have his or her home remodeled by a corporate
contractor. Perhaps four years later the corporation dissolves. One day before dissolution, the
homeowner discovers the defect. Under existing law, this claim may be pursued against the
dissolved corporation and its shareholders. However, if the defect is discovered one day after
the dissolution, under existing law, the claim may not be pursued against the shareholders of
the dissolved corporation. This provides for an inequitable result because it is the shareholders
who have received the bulk of the corporation's assets pursuant to dissolution. See discussion
supra part II.B.
135. See discussion infra part IVAL. and note 148.
136. See discussion infra part IV.A.l. and note 148.
137. The corporations code provides for setting aside assets to pay foreseeable claims
upon dissolution. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(a) (West Supp. 1992). Claims not likely to arise
for a long period of time are generally unforeseeable at dissolution.
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quired to retain any assets to pay the potential claimants.138
While the law has generally experienced a great expansion over
the last fifty years in the areas of tort, products liability, and other
types of claims, corporate law is now permitting shareholders to
make their fortunes in enterprises with a high degree of risk of harm
to the public, and then failing to hold them sufficiently responsible
for these activities.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Claims against corporations dissolved before January 1, 1992
1. Pre-Dissolution Claims
According to Pacific Scene and Penasquitos, any claims brought
against a corporation dissolved prior to January 1, 1992, can be
brought against the dissolved corporation and its shareholders, to the
extent the claims arose prior to dissolution. 39 These decisions re-
present the supreme court's interpretations of the California Corpo-
rations Code statutory provisions prior to amendment. 4 ° These pro-
visions provide for the continuing existence of corporations after they
are dissolved for the purposes of winding up and settling pre-dissolu-
tion claims related to the corporation's business activities.14
Recognition by the supreme court of the legislature's intent in
developing the statutory provisions concerning corporate dissolution
is a relatively new concept in California law."' Pacific Scene repre-
sented a change from the common law notion that after a corporation
dissolved, it could no longer be held responsible for any claims made
against it. 43 The California Supreme Court's decision essentially
formalized the legislature's conclusion that dissolution of a corpora-
tion means the "retirement" of the corporation, rather than its
death. 44
While the law requires corporations to set aside money on dis-
solution for expected claims, claimants whose claims are discovered
later may also be able to reach those funds. 45 However, in many
138. Id.
139. Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182 (Cal. 1988); Penasquitos,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 812 P.2d 154 (Cal. 1991).
140. See supra note 72.
141. CAl.. CORP. CoDE § 2010(a) (West Supp. 1992).
142. See supra note 72.
143. See supra note 72.
144. Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182 (Cal. 1988).
145. See supra part I.A.
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such cases there will not have been enough money set aside to ade-
quately cover all of the claims.14 This state of the law gives corpora-
tions significant but inappropriate financial planning opportuni-
ties;"" particularly in large corporations like pharmaceutical
companies, construction firms, and companies making dangerous
products. When serious problems regarding defects and resultant
damages begin to surface, the corporation can set up a fund to take
care of claims that have already arisen and then dissolve.
A hypothetical example illustrates the point. Recently, the
United States Food and Drug Administration ordered pharmaceuti-
cal companies who manufacture the materials necessary to perform
breast-implant surgeries to cease production . 1 8 Even if no claims
have been made against these companies by women who have suf-
fered harm as a result of undergoing this surgery, the potential is
now there. Previously there was some doubt that the breast-implant
situation would require money to be set aside to meet expected
claims. That is, the product has a design defect that has been discov-
ered with the first lawsuits. But, section 2011 provides that if the
claim is not brought within four years after dissolution, it is unfore-
seeable. 49 Thus, the company need only figure out how many
women will discover the defect and file claims within the next four
years and set aside enough money upon dissolution to cover those
claims.150 Those women whose claims arise after the four year pe-
riod has expired will be prevented from obtaining any recovery and
146. California Corporations Code § 2010(a) only requires corporations to set aside a
sufficient amount of assets to meet expected claims. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2010(a) (West 1992).
In the event claims arise against Dow-Corning, the company can dissolve its subsidiary corpo-
ration responsible for developing and marketing the breast-implant product, set aside enough
funds for claims expected to arise within a four year time frame, and distribute the remaining
assets to its shareholders. Under the current law, claims arising after the four year period will
essentially have no remedy against the subsidiary corporation.
The aforementioned situation must be distinguished from the corporate doctrine known as
"Piercing the Corporate Veil." That doctrine applies only against existing, as opposed to dis-
solved, corporations. Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966).
147. See discussion infra part IV.B.3.
148. After disclosure of documents suggesting that the Dow-Corning's 50%-owned ven-
ture, Dow-Corning Corp., may have rushed a new breast-implant product to market without
sufficient safety tests, the company could face legal liability for the silicone-gel breast-implants
now under scrutiny by the Food and Drug Administration. Dow Corning is the nation's larg-
est manufacturer of the devices, with some 600,000 implanted over the past 30 years. Thomas
M. Burton, Corning Stock Plunges on Disclosures About Breast-Implant Safety Testing,
WAi.L ST. J., Jan. 14, 1992, at 14.
149. CAL.. CORP. CODE § 2011(a)(2)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1992).
150. This could be calculated actuarially. Claims figures to the date of dissolution could
be used to calculate estimated liability or products liability insurance could simply be main-
tained for the four years after dissolution.
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will be severely penalized because their damages have shown up at a
later date.' 51
2. Post-Dissolution Claims
The Pacific Scene decision established the principle that corpo-
rations and shareholders are generally liable to claimants for claims
arising prior to dissolution. 52 The decision further held that, for
corporations dissolved prior to January 1, 1992, shareholders are not
responsible for such claims if they arise after dissolution.'53
Although a claimant suing a corporation dissolved prior to Jan-
uary 1, 1992, is entitled to a judgment, once the corporation has been
dissolved and its assets have been distributed there is often, as a
practical matter, little or no chance for recovery from the corpora-
tion.154 As a result, claimants whose claims arise prior to dissolution
can also recover from the shareholders and are in a much better po-
sition than those claimants whose claims arise after the dissolution of
the corporation. 55 As Penasquitos recognizes, a dissolving corpora-
tion is required by statute to set aside funds for claims it is aware of
at the time of dissolution. 56 But where does that leave claimants
whose injuries arise after dissolution? By definition, a claim arising
after dissolution is generally unknown and will not subject the cor-
poration to the provisions regarding retention of assets. According to
Penasquitos, the claimant can still sue the corporation, but in real-
ity, once it has been dissolved and its assets have been distributed
(and possibly even reinvested in new business enterprises), there is
little or no recovery.
157
There is the option of recovery from the corporation's insurance car-
rier for injury sustained via the corporate enterprise.15 8 However,
this type of claimant is faced with the various problems in collecting
on expired insurance policies. These problems include meeting the
requirements of the insurance policy for submitting claims, and in
the case of mass claims, competing with other claimants for what
little funds exist under the policy itself. 59 Also, the shareholders are
151. As in the DES cases, see supra note 104, these claims are not likely to arise for a
long period of time.
152. Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182, 1183 (Cal. 1988).
153. Penasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court, 812 P.2d 154, 160 (Cal. 1991).
154. See discussion infra part IlI.B.
155. Penasquitos, 812 P.2d at 160.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. CAL.. CORP. Coi). § 2011(a) (West Supp. 1992).
159. Because insurance policies typically are limited in terms of their dollar amount,
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unlikely in many instances to continue to carry insurance after disso-
lution.1"' Only if they expect claims would they even consider this.
Even then, they are unlikely to substantially deplete the corporate
assets for the purpose of carrying insurance.161 Moreover, there may
be practical problems in obtaining insurance to continue error and
omissions policies or products liability policies on a dissolving
company.
For claims against corporations dissolved prior to January 1,
1992, California corporate law requires the dissolved corporation to
remain responsible for its debts even after it ceases to exist.16 Fur-
thermore, the shareholders are not responsible for those debts.' 63
The rule that only the corporation remains responsible for its debts
was developed with the intention of protecting shareholders' future
investments.' 6 4 The premise behind this public policy is the notion
that shareholders should not have to be concerned with potential lia-
bility because they cannot safely reinvest their corporate earnings if
they may eventually have large judgments to pay.16 The California
Supreme Court case law as well as the California Corporations Code
have both recognized the policy that shareholders need to be able to
retrieve their funds from one business venture and reallocate those
funds into another business enterprise. 66 Pacific Scene also recog-
nized this need in holding that shareholders of a dissolved corpora-
tion cannot be sued for claims arising after dissolution, even if those
claims relate to the activities in which their corporations were
engaged.' 67
By protecting shareholders' investments, the law sacrifices the
many claimants will never receive adequate compensation, if they are compensated at all, for
their injuries.
160. See James Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corpora-
tion Law, 30 U. TORONro L.J., 145-46 (1980).
161. Since shareholders have invested in the corporation for the purpose of producing a
profit and shielding themselves from liability, it is unlikely they will expend any more in
insurance expenses than is required by law. See supra part II.A.
162. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2010 (West Supp. 1992).
163. Pacilic Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Cal. 1988).
164. See infra part IV.B.3 for a discussion of the balancing of shareholders rights to
reinvest the proceeds of the assets distributed to them upon dissolution with the rights of claim-
ants to damages for corporate misconduct.
165. See infra part IV.B.3 for a discussion of the balancing of shareholders rights to
reinvest the proceeds of the assets distributed to them upon dissolution with the rights of claim-
ants to damages for corporate misconduct.
166. See infra part IV.B.3 for a discussion of the balancing of shareholders rights to
reinvest the proceeds of the assets distributed to them upon dissolution with the rights of claim-
ants to damages for corporate misconduct.
167. Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182, 1183 (Cal. 1988).
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rights of creditors and customers with claims against the corporation.
Statutes of limitations have long existed to protect potential defend-
ants from having to worry endlessly about causes of action being
raised against them.168 The issue is whether shareholders should be
given a significantly shorter time period than the usual statute of
limitations for claims to be brought against them.
B. Claims Arising Against Corporations Dissolved On or After
January 1, 1992
1. Three Main Problems
Indeed, while the legislature attempted to balance the competing
interests of the finality of claims and compensation of creditors, the
revised code fails to appropriately balance the rights of claimants and
shareholders of dissolved corporations in three specific ways. While
claims arising against corporations dissolved after January 1, 1992,
have a greater number of potential defendants than before, the re-
vised statutory scheme is still woefully inadequate.
a. Four Year Time Limit Eliminates Recoveries on Large
Classes of Claims
First, the revised code fails to fully consider the ramifications of
the four year limitation incorporated into the bill. This current state
of the law is an inappropriate public policy failing to address very
serious tort and products liability claims that may arise well after
four years. Because certain types of businesses present long term
risks to society, the law has evolved to provide for liability extending
over long periods of time, even generations, where necessary, to pro-
tect the public. Despite this long history of judicial precedent and
experience, the revised code allows corporations to circumvent the
centuries of legal evolution and precedent by segmenting their busi-
nesses, operating them for limited periods of time, dissolving, and
reincorporating later.169 This new legal policy allows devious corpo-
rations to escape all liability for damages caused by their high risk
businesses, and allows the shareholders to withdraw a fortune with-
out ever being accountable for the long term risks and damage they
have imposed on society.
The above described scenario was vividly brought to life in the
168. Section 337.15 of California's Code of Civil Procedure provides for a ten year stat-
ute of limitations in construction defect cases. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 337.15 (West 1989).
169. See supra note 6.
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Pacific Scene and Penasquitos cases where the supreme court sanc-
tioned the transparent scheme of a residential land developer who
had incorporated, developed a single project, dissolved his company,
and reincorporated again for each new development while continuing
to do exactly the same kind of work. 7 ' Each time a project was
completed, the developer withdrew his profits from the business by
dissolving. This scheme has now been given permanent protection
from the victims of the company's shoddy and irresponsible business
practices. Had the statute been enacted at an earlier date, the claim-
ants in the lead cases may have been able to recover a portion of
their damages since their causes of action had, in fact, arisen within
the four year limit.' 7 ' However, many similar causes of action will
not arise within four years.' 72 The legislature has long recognized
this truth by developing a number of statutes of limitations providing
for periods longer than four years for cases where the damage is not
likely to be discovered for a long period of time. 73
For example, section 337.15 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure provides a ten year statute of limitations for real estate
and construction related claims." 4 This statute of limitations con-
templates the reality that real estate construction claims are not
likely to show up until many years after the structure or other devel-
opment has been completed. 75 The legislature has already developed
a comprehensive scheme to balance the competing interests of corpo-
rations and potential claimants by developing specific statutes of lim-
itations which are tailored to the differing types of claims.' 7  The
revised section 2011 of the Corporations Code, however, provides a
loophole for those businesses intelligent enough to plan for it.'7 For
these businesses, the statute of limitations is effectively nullified.' 8
170. Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182 (Cal. 1988); Penasquitos,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 812 P.2d 154 (Cal. 1991).
171. See supra note 89.
172. See supra notes 104 and 148 for illustrations of pharmaceutical cases not likely to
arise within a four year time frame.
173. See supra note 168.
174. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337.15 (West 1989).
175. See supra note 103.
176. See id. § 337.15.
177. California Corporations are required by statute to set aside funds to meet only
those claims known about at dissolution. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011 (West Supp. 1992).
178. Charles Fennessey, Attorney for State Senator Ed Davis' office, revealed that the
four year limitation was an arbitrary decision, made primarily because the causes of action
against Penasquitos, Inc. arose within four years after the corporation's effective date of disso-
lution. Interview with Charles Fennessey, Attorney for the Office of State Senator Ed Davis of
California, Sacramento, CA (Jan. 6, 1992.) When it was pointed out that construction cases
actually have a ten year statute of limitations, it was further revealed that the four year limit
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The four year time limit not only prevents recovery in construc-
tion defect cases, but it also eliminates claims arising in innumerable
other areas. Potential claims not likely to arise within a four year
time frame include all claims where the statute of limitations begins
to run upon discovery of the problem rather than with a product sale
or project completion.17 9 Such claims include fraud, 80 professional
malpractice,'' drug and pharmaceutical companies manufacturing
medications, 8 ' and medical procedures 83 whose dangers are not
fully revealed for many years after their implementation on
humans. 84 An obvious new example of the potential for harm in-
volves the newly discovered breast implant procedures that have been
developed in the last twenty to thirty years.'8 5 This is a fertile new
area of litigation involving severe disfiguration, paralysis, and even
death.' 8" Because the effects of such new medical procedures are not
fully known or may be intentionally hidden in the development
phases, any defects will inevitably show up many years after the four
year time limit. Injured claimants will have no recovery in these in-
stances despite a strong policy of the law to the contrary.'
8 7
b. Elimination of Formerly Recoverable Claims
The second problem with the amendment is that the statute in
its present form eliminates claims which were specifically recoverable
was not well thought out and that neither that statute of limitations nor the potential for drug
companies to manufacture and dissolve were taken into consideration in drafting the bill. Id.
179. Such claims include fraud cases. For example, if a fraud is not discovered within
four years, the statute of limitations for the fraud-based cause of action does not start running
until the fraud has been discovered. The statute in its current state, however, will still cut off
liability for any cases of fraud not discovered within four years of the date of corporate
dissolution.
180. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338 (West 1992).
181. Id. § 340.6.
182. Id. § 340.5.
183. Id.
184. See supra part IV.A.
185. See supra note 104 (discussing the DES cases which did not arise for many years
after the drug manufacturer distributed the drug).
186. Burton, supra note 148. In the early part of January 1992, the United States Food
and Drug Administration ordered producers of silicon breast-implants to cease all production
and implantation. After disclosure of documents suggesting that Dow-Corning's 50%-owned
venture, Dow-Corning Corp., may have rushed a new breast-implant product to market with-
out sufficient safety tests, the company could face legal liability for the silicone-gel breast-
implants now under scrutiny by the Food and Drug Administration. Dow Corning is the
nation's largest manufacturer of the devices, with some 600,000 implanted over the past 30
years. Id.
187. Id.
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prior to its enactment."" For example, the case law prior to the stat-
utory enactment permitted the shareholders of dissolved corporations
to be sued for claims arising prior to dissolution forever, under the
equitable trust fund theory, to the extent of distributed assets and
subject to the statute of limitations."8 9 All such claims are now elimi-
nated after four years from the date of dissolution. 90 In addition,
when claims are known prior to the corporate dissolution, assets
must be set aside by law to meet those claims while the remaining
assets may be distributed to the shareholders. 9 ' While this proce-
dure provides an available fund for some claims, no assets are re-
quired to be set aside if the claim has not yet come to the attention of
the corporation's board of directors. 9 So, where claims for un-
known matters could previously have been made against the share-
holders under the equitable trust fund theory, now they are elimi-
nated.' With the amendment to the statute, claimants cannot file
additional claims against shareholders under any circumstance after
a period of four years.9 Whereas claimants could sue without any
time limitations prior to the statutory enactment, their claims are
now limited to a four year time frame. Thus, some claimants will be
denied recovery for their injuries.
c. Recovery Limited to Distributed Assets
Finally, the statute denies adequate recovery to claimants by
limiting any recovery against the shareholders to the value of the
assets distributed to each individual shareholder at dissolution.' 95 In
this instance, the statute fails to consider the potential for illegitimate
corporate planning of greedy shareholders. In these cases, the statute
fails to address the situation where a corporation heavily laden with
potential claims against it disposes of a large portion of its assets
prior to dissolution.' 96 Upon dissolution, the corporation distributes
the remaining pithy assets to its shareholders and claimants are per-
mitted to sue only for what little was distributed at dissolution. In
such a case the claimants are unable to touch the large sums distrib-
188. See discussion supra part I.D.
189. Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182 (Cal. 1988).
190. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011 (West Supp. 1992).
191. Id. § 2010(a).
192. Id.
193. California Corporations Code § 2011 in its present form was revised by the Legis-
lature in October 1991. See supra notes 16-17.
194. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(a)(2)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1992).
195. Id.
196. See supra part IV.B.3.
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uted to the shareholders prior to dissolution.
2. Intention of the Legislature
Senate Bill 1188 was developed with the intention of overturn-
ing the result in Pacific Scene and to permit causes of action to be
brought against the shareholders of dissolved corporations, within
specified limits, regardless of whether the claims arose before or after
dissolution.1 97 The law was developed by the California State Bar
Association in response to the Pacific Scene case based on the argu-
ment that the current law created an arbitrary and unfair distinction
between pre-dissolution and post-dissolution claims. 9'
Senate Bill 1188 was intended to enact a comprehensive system
regulating the manner in which such claims, whether they arise pre-
dissolution or post-dissolution, may be pursued.' 99 The bar argued
that S.B. 1188 properly balances the competing needs of dissolved
corporations and shareholders to have finality and certainty with re-
gard to corporate matters with the needs of creditors to have some
opportunity to pursue legal remedies against dissolved corporations
and their shareholders.2"' The California State Legislature, by
amending the corporations code and overruling the Pacific Scene de-
cision, agreed with the notion that claimants ought to be able to re-
cover for injuries against dissolved corporations. Recognizing that it
is the corporation's decision to dissolve and not the creditor's or other
claimant's, the legislature concluded that it was unfair to distinguish
between pre-dissolution and post-dissolution claims.2 ' The final
amendment to section 2011 is also sensitive to this need. Moreover,
the sponsor notes that this bill is based on the Model Business Cor-
porations Act, which, in fact, provides a five year statute of limita-
tions after dissolution.20 2
197. See supra notes 24-27.
198. See supra note 27.
199. Hearing on S.B. 1188 Before the Assembly Subcomm. on the Admin. of Justice, at
2 (1991).
200. Id.
201. See id.
202. Hearing on S.B. 1188 Before the Assembly Subcomm. on the Admin. of Justice, at
2 (1991). Lloyd G. Connelley, Chairperson, explained:
S.B. [sic] 1188 enacts a comprehensive system regulating the manner in which
claims, whether they arise pre-dissolution [sic] or post-dissolution [sic], may be
pursued. Moreover, the sponsor notes that this bill is based on the Model Busi-
ness Corporations Act, which in fact, provides a five year statute of limitations
after dissolution. [Note that S.B. 1188 contains a four year period in which to
bring these actions.]
19931
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
It should be noted that the Model Business Corporations Act
had originally provided for a two year limitation.203 After its imple-
mentation in several states, this was found unsatisfactory because it
eliminated too many just claims."0 4 In fact, the two year limit was
not much different from the rule prevailing before 1834. It was ex-
actly this problem and its abuses which caused the courts to abandon
the legal concept of the immediate cessation of the existence of a
corporation upon dissolution and the concomitant development of the
equitable trust fund theory.2"' While the legislature's concern and
attempt to correct the supreme court's apparent tendency to revert to
antiquated theories of corporate law appears to have been motivated
by a desire to bring corporate law back in line with modern legal
theories, this attempt has failed. The four year time limit fails to
consider the vast and intricate theories of modern law. Long term
environmental damage and personal injuries from unsafe substances
are obvious examples where modern law has made massive changes
in the continuing liability of businesses which cause damage to inno-
cent victims. This revised statute may be acceptable for the types of
claims that have been brought for centuries, but it fails to provide in
any way for modern tort and product defect cases. As a result, the
legislature's attempt to balance competing interests has utterly failed
to consider the inequitable ramifications for claimants in these
situations.206
3. Major Legal Concerns
The problems with tort product defect cases are numerous.
Among the greatest concerns to be considered are the opportunities
for large pharmaceutical companies to abuse the law. For example,
when pharmaceutical companies develop new drugs or cosmetic sur-
gery treatments, there are no restrictions on setting up subsidiary
corporations to develop these products or services.20 7 Where subsidi-
203. The amendment to § 2011 of the California Corporations Code is based, in part,
on the Model Business Corporations Act. The comments to the legislative history of S.B. 1188
explain that, "This bill is based on the Model Business Corporations Act, which, in fact,
provides a five (formerly two) year statute of limitations after dissolution." Hearing on S.
1188 Before the Assembly Subcomm. on the Admin. of Justice, at 2 (1991).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See id.
207. The United States Food and Drug Administration had previously approved devel-
opment and implementation of the breast-implants produced by Dow-Corning. As is often the
case with medical procedures, time has illustrated the questionable safety of the devices and the
FDA has subsequently halted all development and implementation of breast-implant devices
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aries are used in this manner, the subsidiary corporation can manu-
facture the drug or supply the service. 2 In the event problems arise
with these products or services, the subsidiary can be dissolved with
all of its assets distributed to its parent corporation free of creditors'
claims.2 0 9 Thus, when problems arise after the four year time frame,
no one will be held responsible, not even the large parent
corporation.2
1 0
The only area in which S.B. 1188 will have minimal impact is
in the garden variety of claims, such as contract disputes, debt collec-
tion cases, and tort actions where the damages become apparent im-
mediately.21 For example, had the statute been in place before the
Pacific Scene case, those particular claimants would have been pro-
tected because the land subsidence occurred immediately. 212 Most
hidden construction defects do not appear within the four year time
limitation, and it is those plaintiffs who will suffer from the effects
of this inadequately considered statute.
Corporate law is designed to protect shareholder investments.
2 13
On the other hand, claimants have a right to compensation for legiti-
mate damages caused by corporate business activities.21 4 Part of the
public policy allowing shareholders to be sued for causes of action
arising after dissolution, is that the shareholders now hold corporate
assets from which claimants would have recovered absent dissolution.
Allowing a return to the antiquated corporate law theories of the
nineteenth century is simply inappropriate today.
and procedures until there is sufficient evidence that they are safe. Burton, supra note 148.
208. Id.
209. This issue is not to be confused with the doctrine of "Piercing the Corporate Veil."
See supra note 146.
210. See supra note 146.
211. For example, the statute is useful in the case of the dissolved dairy that sold bad
milk at the local grocery stores and the auto mechanic who has closed shop the day after he
negligently fixed your brakes.
212. The legislature intended S.B. 1188 to amend existing law with regard to share-
holders and not to affect the corporation's liability. In a letter from the author of the Bill,
California Senator Ed Davis, to Rick Rollens, Secretary of the Senate, the Senator explained:
"S.B. 1188 is intended to make the statutory changes ...necessary to overturn the result in
Pacific Scene v. Penasquitos, Inc., 250 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1988)." Letter from Ed Davis, Califor-
nia State Senator, to Rick Rollens, Secretary of the Senate, State of California, (Aug. 30, 1991)
(on file with the Office of the California State Senate).
213. See supra note 53.
214. Were claimants not entitled to remedies for their injuries, few people would engage
in transactions with corporations and the whole notion of the corporate shield in order to
encourage people to go into business without incurring personal liability would be utterly lost.
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V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Claims Arising Against Corporations Dissolved Before Janu-
ary 1, 1992
Because the law varies according to when the claim arose and
when the corporation was dissolved, the solutions to the problems
must also vary accordingly. The California Supreme Court's current
treatment of post-dissolution claims arising against dissolved corpo-
rations results in an inequitable situation for injured parties. The
legislature should provide a system to defer specific situations to the
courts for a more equitable approach to dealing with the different
claims. A legislated return to the equitable trust fund theory for the
recovery of distributed corporate assets suggests a more fair result to
all interested parties. Under this theory, corporate assets should be
distributed to the shareholders upon dissolution, but should remain
subject to the theoretical trust for claimants whose claims arise after
dissolution. In lawsuits, judges can make equitable allocations to the
various claimants and defendants, thereby balancing the interests
among the parties.
B. Claims Arising Against Corporations Dissolved After January
1, 1992
Since cases after January 1, 1992, are governed by statute, it is
most appropriate that the current statute be revised to rectify the
situation. The recently revised statute should be used as a general
rule for most claims, but two major exceptions should be made. The
first exception would be for areas of the law where the legislature
has already provided for long statutes of limitations. For example,
many years of experience resulted in a ten year statute of limitations
in real estate construction cases.216 Most serious defects in real prop-
erty are not discovered until many years after the construction has
been completed. In construction defect cases, therefore, the time pe-
riod for bringing a cause of action should be lengthened to at least
ten years. The result of the statute in its current state is to cut off the
statute of limitations by six years.21
The second exception would pertain to activities which are
likely to result in a high degree of risk of harm to the public. In such
215. See discussion supra part IV.B.I.a.
216. California Corporations Code § 2011 eliminates the recovery of any claims against
shareholders not raised within four years after dissolution. CAL. CORP. CODF § 2011 (West
Supp. 1992).
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cases, reasonably foreseeable harms are often not discovered in four
years time.21 7 For example, in cases where a new drug or medical
procedure is imparted on an individual, the results often cannot be
precisely determined for years.218 The time period for bringing an
action against the shareholders of dissolved corporations which were
engaged in businesses with a high degree of risk of harm to the pub-
lic should be determined under the formerly applicable equitable
trust fund theory with the added proviso that the doctrine should be
applied to claims arising after dissolution in addition to claims aris-
ing prior to dissolution. Whether a particular activity falls within the
extended liability period can be determined on an individual basis
with a factual determination made by a judge. Because these types of
claims often do not arise for many years afterward, allowing the
shareholders to escape with the profits without liability is inequita-
ble.219 These two exceptions to the general rule provide for a much
more equitable result for individuals suffering the aforementioned
types of harm from corporations that existed long enough to generate
a profit and cause the claimant's damage.
Incorporating these two exceptions into section 2011 of the Cal-
ifornia Corporations Code, the amended statute might read as
follows:
§ 2011. ACTIONS AGAINST DISSOLVED CORPORATION AND ITS
SHAREHOLDERS; ARISING BEFORE OR AFTER DISSOLUTION;
LIMITATIONS; SERVICE OF PROCESS; QUIET TITLE ACTIONS;
SERVICE ON SECRETARY OF STATE.
(a) (1) Causes of action against a dissolved corporation,
whether arising before or after the dissolution of the corpora-
tion, may be enforced against any of the following:
(A) Against the dissolved corporation, to the extent of its
undistributed assets, including, without limitation, any insur-
ance assets held by the corporation that may be available to
satisfy claims.
(B) If any of the assets of the dissolved corporation have
been distributed to shareholders, against shareholders of the
dissolved corporation to the extent of their pro rata share of
the claim or to the extent of the corporate assets distributed to
them upon dissolution of the corporation, whichever is less.
A shareholder's total liability under this section may not
exceed the total amount of assets of the dissolved corporation
217. See supra note 104 for examples of claims not likely to arise within four years.
218. See supra notes 104, 148.
219. See supra notes 146, 148.
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distributed to the shareholder upon dissolution of the
corporation.
(2) Except as set forth in subparts (C) and (D), herein,
and subdivision (c), below, all causes of action against a share-
holder of a dissolved corporation arising under this section are
extinguished unless the claimant commences a proceeding to
enforce the cause of action against that shareholder of a dis-
solved corporation prior to the earlier of the following:
(A) The expiration of the statute of limitations applicable
to the cause of action.
(B) Four years after the effective date of the dissolution of
the corporation except that:
(i) In cases involving real estate development and or con-
struction, as defined under section 337.15, all causes of action
against a shareholder of such a dissolved corporation are ex-
tinguished unless the claimant commences a proceeding to en-
force the cause of action against that shareholder of a dis-
solved corporation prior to the expiration of the ten year
statute of limitations applicable to that cause of action; and
(ii) In cases involving a corporation engaged in a busi-
ness with a high degree of risk of harm to the public, the time
period for bringing causes of action against the shareholders of
dissolved corporations will be determined under the equitable
trust fund theory by the courts reviewing the matter regardless
of whether the claim arose prior to or after the dissolution.
(iii) As a matter of procedure only, and not for purposes
of determining liability, shareholders of the dissolved corpora-
tion may be sued in the corporate name of the corporation upon
any cause of action against the corporation. This section does
not affect the rights of the corporation or its creditors under
Section 2009, or the rights, if any, of creditors under the Uni-
form Fraudulent Transfer Act, which may arise against the
shareholders of a corporation.
(iv) This subdivision applies to corporations dissolved on
and after January 1, 1992. Corporations dissolved prior to
that date are subject to the law in effect prior to that date.
VI. CONCLUSION
California's current laws concerning continuing corporate and
shareholder liability after dissolution are inadequate to equitably
balance the competing interests of the involved parties. If a claim is
brought against a corporation dissolved prior to January 1, 1992, the
claimant can sue the corporation and its shareholders on a pre-disso-
lution claim, but is limited to only suing the corporation on a post-
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dissolution claim. 220 The result is to arbitrarily distinguish among
claimants, depending on when the particular claim arose. This state
of the law penalizes claimants whose claims arise after a corporation
has dissolved.
Recognizing the arbitrariness of this law, the legislature
amended California's Corporations Code so that a claim brought
against a corporation dissolved after January 1, 1992, can be
brought against the shareholders of the dissolved corporations as well
as the corporation itself.22 1 While the corporation in the latter in-
stance can be sued indefinitely, shareholder liability is limited to a
four year period of time and to the extent of the corporation's assets
distributed upon dissolution. 22
For corporations dissolved prior to the statutory revision, the
law arbitrarily distinguishes among who can recover. The law effec-
tive prior to January 1, 1992, reflects a public policy favoring share-
holder's future investments while sacrificing the individual claimant's
rights to recovery. Although the statutory amendment applicable to
claims against corporations dissolved on or after January 1, 1992,
attempts to rectify the situation by holding shareholders liable to
some extent, it only does so in a limited number of cases. Under the
new law, large classes of claimants are extremely limited in ob-
taining redress from dissolved corporations. As a result, shareholders
continue to have their investments protected under the revised corpo-
rate law statute.
The purpose of this comment was to address the current inequi-
table state of California's doctrine of continuing corporate and share-
holder liability. This purpose was accomplished by examining the
historical case law development and recent statutory amendment
passed to revise prior law. Additionally, this comment illustrated the
shortcomings of the doctrine and analyzed the problems of potential
claimants who are prevented from recovery. Finally, the comment
proposed a solution that more equitably balances the competing in-
terests in such aforementioned cases by providing more claimants
with an opportunity to recover for the damages arising from the bus-
iness activities of dissolved corporations.
The proposed solution amends existing law by adopting many
aspects of formerly applicable common law remedies as well as re-
flecting California's statutes of limitations. Most importantly, the
220. Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 758 P.2d 1182, 1187 (Cal. 1988).
221. CAL.. CORP. CODE § 2011 (West Supp. 1992).
222. Id.
19931
170 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
proposed solution more equitably provides for the interests of claim-
ants as well as shareholders and insures that recoveries will be made.
Unlike the current state of the law, the solution offered will achieve
the Legislature's intended balance, without disrupting the underlying
premises behind corporations law. The proposed solution should be
adopted, because it will put an end to the cycle of inequity that traps
large classes of seriously injured plaintiff's and will ultimately bene-
fit all society by presenting equitable solutions to remedy the
problems involved.
Moira Ann Hogan
